While there is now ample empirical evidence that privatization improves the performance of divested firms, to date there has been very little study of why these performance improvements occur. We use a sample of 118 firms (from 29 countries and 28 industries), privatized via public share offering between 1961 and 1995, to address this important issue. We first contribute to the existing empirical literature by documenting significant increases in profitability, efficiency, output, and capital expenditure, and significant decreases in leverage following privatization. Unlike other large-sample empirical studies of share-issue privatization, we then study the determinants of these performance improvements. Our data provide evidence of stronger profitability gains for firms with lower employee ownership and higher state ownership, stronger output gains for firms in competitive industries and for firms in countries with faster growing economies. Stronger efficiency gains are observed when foreign ownership is high, for firms that restructure, for firms in developing nations, and when the share offer size is relatively small compared to total national market capitalization. We find that higher levels of employee ownership are associated with greater increases in capital expenditure after privatization. Finally, our results indicate that leverage increases more for firms with higher foreign ownership, those located in developing economies and those in countries with rapidly growing economies.
Introduction
During the second half of 1999, the cumulative value of privatization sales proceeds received by governments around the world topped $1 trillion. A further $180 billion was raised in 2000. While privatization has thus significantly reduced the fiscal burden of many governments, and has dramatically impacted the world's economic landscape, this phenomenon has also raised important economic questions. Over the last few decades, privatization (the sale of previously state-owned enterprises to private investors) has significantly altered the global economic landscape. While privatizations continue to be implemented by governments around the world, many questions are yet to be satisfactorily answered. This study both adds to the growing empirical evidence documenting post-privatization performance improvements and investigates how privatization affects a firm's financial and operating performance. Using primary data sources, we collect extensive accounting and market information for 118 companies privatized from 1961 to 1995. Following privatization, these firms exhibit significant increases in profitability, real sales, operating efficiency and capital expenditure, as well as significant decreases in leverage. These results highlight a more interesting and important question: why do these improvements occur? In this paper, we seek to address this question by identifying the causes of the performance improvements following privatization.
From a point of being extremely controversial during Margaret Thatcher's first government, privatization has now become (almost) orthodox economic policy throughout much of the world. More than one hundred governments have privatized at least some of their state-owned enterprises (SOEs) since 1980, and these governments have now raised over 750 billion dollars just through share-issue privatizations (SIPs) during the past twenty years. These share offerings today have a total market value of over $3.4 trillion and are almost invariably either the first or second most valuable (or both) company listed on every stock market outside of the United States (Boutchkova and Megginson (2000) ).
Additionally, the ten largest (and 30 of the 35 largest) share offerings in history have all been SIPs.
Given the economic and political significance of privatization, it is not surprising that these programs have been the subject of considerable academic research. Numerous recent studies have empirically examined whether privatization has "worked" in the sense of yielding post-divestiture performance improvements. These studies are surveyed in Djankov and Murrell (2000a,b) , Dyck (2000) , Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (2000) , Megginson and Netter (2001) and Shirley (1999) . Eight of these works have examined either a single industry or a single country, while seven are multi-national, multiindustry studies. Six of the eight single-industry/single-country papers show significant performance improvements [Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) , Ramamurti (1997) , LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) , Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl (1997) , Eckel, Eckel, and Singal (1997) , and D'Souza (1998)], while two (both of which examine the British experience) show ambiguous or negative results [Martin and Parker (1995) and Newbery and Pollitt (1997) ]. Six of the seven multi-industry/multinational studies show significant, often massive, performance improvements after privatization [Galal, Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1994) , Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994) , Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1997) , Pohl, Anderson, Cleassens, and Djankov (1997) , Boubakri and Cosset (1998), and D'Souza and Megginson (1999) ]. The seventh [Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) ] is generally supportive but finds that at least some of the performance improvement occurs before privatization. In total, these studies clearly show that privatization does work (i.e., improves financial and operating efficiency), but ours will be one of the first large sample studies to empirically examine why it works.
We feel that our multi-national, multi-industry sample provides a broad perspective of shareissue privatizations and offers significant opportunities to identify the sources of the efficiency improvements in newly-privatized firms. Using both conventional univariate pre-versus postprivatization comparisons and regression analysis, we examine the political, economic and ownership structure influences on performance changes in privatized firms. Such insights regarding the determinants of post-privatization performance improvements should provide valuable guidance to government officials, investors, managers, and financial economists. This paper is organized as follows. Section II surveys the theoretical and empirical literature to identify the potential sources of post-privatization performance improvements. Section III describes our data and defines our testable predictions. Section IV outlines our empirical methodology and Section V presents our findings. Section VI provides a summary and conclusion.
II. Potential Sources of Post-Privatization Performance Improvements
The finance and economics literatures suggest reasons why privatization might cause firms to operate more productively. First, privatization subjects managers to the pressure of the financial markets and to the monitoring and discipline of profit-oriented investors. Having publicly-traded stock that can be used in performance-based compensation programs should also help incentivize managers of divested firms. Second, the change in the firm's ownership redefines the firm's objectives and the manager's incentives. As stressed by Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) and Nellis (1999) , state-owned enterprises suffer from having multiple objectives, many of which are imposed on them by political masters who reap most of the benefits of politicized decision-making, yet bear few of the costs. Third, releasing the firm from government control provides greater entrepreneurial opportunities, even as freeing SOEs from the financial constraints imposed by the government's public sector borrowing requirements opens attractive financing options. In the following paragraphs, we examine each of these broad changes brought on by privatization and identify specific, testable sources of potential performance improvements.
A. Capital Market Discipline
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1997) and Estrin and Perotin (1991) argue that state-owned firms are less efficient because they are immune from capital market scrutiny. As a result, managerial performance is inadequately monitored. The public trading of shares establishes the possibility of takeover by outsiders, introduces the discipline of the managerial labor market, and provides the ability to link compensation to performance. As a result, when shares trade in the public equity markets, owners have enhanced capacity to spur greater managerial effort and accountability. Though empirical research on post-privatization compensation policies is extremely limited, both Wolfram (1998) and Cragg and Dyck (1999) document significant increases in total compensation for managers of privatized British firms. Additionally, there has been a wave of takeovers and mergers involving former SOEs in recent years. Even though the divested company has been the bidder in most of these contests, the mere fact that contests involving privatized companies have occurred suggests that the introduction of capital market monitoring may trigger post-privatization performance improvements. Therefore, we seek to further establish a linkage between the characteristics of the specific capital markets and performance of firms following privatization.
Recent academic research has clearly documented that the intensity of the capital market pressure depends upon the size and sophistication of the nation's financial system (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998 , 1999 , 2000 , Levine (1997) , Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) , Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) ). While many of the firms in our sample are from countries with highly-developed equity markets, many others operate in lessdeveloped financial markets. Holmstrom and Tirole (1995) and Levine (1992) note that the monitoring benefits vary considerably with the level of market development. As a result, some privatized firms face greater market monitoring than others do. In fact, in countries with poorly-developed capital markets, privatization may offer little efficiency advantages over government ownership. Estrin and Perotin (1991) argue that, in nations with weak financial systems, government ownership may be advantageous because the state may have greater access to information and stronger powers to sanction managerial performance than private shareholders. Accordingly, the level of capital market development should be an important determinant of post-privatization efficiency gains, and we expect that the firms whose shares trade in more sophisticated and active equity markets should display the strongest performance improvements.
A larger and more sophisticated capital market may also contribute to an economic and regulatory environment conducive to the post-privatization performance improvements. Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and the studies cited above all identify a link between market development and economic efficiency. For example, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) argue that a country with a sophisticated and active financial market is more likely to implement a market-friendly policy framework. Such policies should favor the success of privatization programs. Additionally, a welldeveloped and active financial market allows the newly-privatized firm greater access to the capital frequently required for further restructuring and equipment modernization. Finally, a larger and more active market is more likely to be informationally efficient. Dow and Gorton (1997) and Vickers and Yarrow (1992) emphasize that stock prices must be informationally efficient to provide an accurate retrospective of managerial performance. If not, the information conveyed by the stock price has diminished value for monitoring and performance-based compensation plans. Therefore, we expect that firms privatized in more efficient markets will demonstrate larger improvements in operating efficiency.
Accordingly, we draw from this theory to test whether the level of development of the local financial market is a significant contributor to the post-privatization efficiency improvements.
A nation's political and economic environment may also affect the magnitude of the change in the firm's performance following privatization. To borrow terms used in a slightly different context by Biais and Perotti (2001) , whether a divesting government is "committed" (to privatization and economic reform) or "populist" (selling SOEs just to raise money) should significantly influence the performance of privatized firms. Several empirical studies support this prediction. For example, Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994) note that the Thatcher government (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) was decidedly pro-business.
As a result, companies privatized in the U.K. during this period should be expected to exhibit greater efficiency gains than firms operating under less market-friendly regimes. Also, Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley (1992) suggest that a country with a fairly sophisticated economy and higher income is more likely to have a market-friendly policy framework. Such factors should increase the chances of successful privatization. However, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) find that firms in developing nations exhibit very strong performance improvements following privatization. Therefore, to potentially resolve this ambiguity, we test whether the level of development of a nation's economy is a significant determinant of post-privatization efficiency improvements.
For managers to feel the full disciplining pressure of the capital market, the rights of the individual shareholder (particularly the voting rights) must be enforced by the country's legal system.
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) note that the amount of protection of shareholders' legal rights varies significantly across countries. Specifically, shareholders in countries with an English common law tradition benefit from much stronger legal protection than those living in nations with French civil law systems. The authors find that markets affording greater shareholder protection are consistently larger and more efficient. Bortolotti, Fantini, Siniscalco, and Vitalini (1997) argue that privatizing governments recognize the importance of shareholder rights protection when formulating privatization policy. The authors determine that countries that provide greater legal protection of shareholder rights are more likely to implement share-issue privatizations. Additionally, Pagano and Roell (1998) argue that stronger legal protection of investor rights hinders collusion between the firm and potential monitors and promotes more effective managerial monitoring. Therefore, we predict that the degree of shareholder rights protection within a country should be positively related to performance improvements following privatization.
In addition to writing laws that support private investors, a government must also enforce these laws to effectively protect minority investors. Knack and Keefer (1995) recognize that institutions that secure property rights encourage efficient investment and are crucial to economic growth. Wurgler (2000) notes that a government's commitment to investor protection will break down if either a government writes strong laws but does not strictly enforce them or has strictly enforced but weak laws. Accordingly, the degree of investor legal protection is based upon both the strength of the laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement. We expect greater post-privatization performance improvements in nations with laws that protect private investors and a legal system that efficiently enforces the laws.
B. Incentive Effects of Changes in State Ownership, Foreign Ownership, and Employee Ownership
Privatization redefines the firm's objective function. While state-owned firms typically pursue multiple and often conflicting objectives, privatized firms focus on profit maximization. However, the degree to which the privatized firms can pursue profit maximization differs considerably across our sample companies. Governments may still wield significant influence through policies regarding competition, regulation, and taxes. As a result, a government's commitment to capitalism and to creating a pro-business environment should be a determinant of a newly-privatized firm's efficiency improvements. Perotti (1995) and Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999) note that uncertainty about a government's commitment to privatization affects the manager's incentives to restructure the privatized firm. By signaling its commitment to capitalism, the government convinces managers that it will not expropriate profits through policy reversals and motivates managers to maximize value. Perotti (1995) contends that this signal is necessary for the economic benefits of privatization to begin. 1 He states that governments can credibly signal commitment by initially selling a small portion of the firm. This bonds the government to bear residual risk and avoid expropriating profits through policy changes. However, Paudyal, Saadouni, and Briston (1998) argue that selling only a small stake increases the likelihood of continuing government interference and possible renationalization. Since SOEs pursue objectives that frequently conflict with profit-maximization, the level of postprivatization ownership retained by the state should affect the newly-privatized firm's efficiency 1 Pohl, Anderson, Claessens, and Djankov (1997) present evidence that managers undertake restructuring in anticipation of privatization if the government commitment is credible. Ramamurti (1997) and Bortolotti, Fantini, Siniscalco, and Vitalini (1997) argue that the threat of government expropriation limits the effectiveness of privatizations.
2 In their study of Malaysian privatizing IPOs, Paudyal et al. (1998) find a positive relation between the percentage of capital sold and the IPO's initial premium. They contend that the market reacts favorably since the larger percentage sold reduces the probability of government interference.
improvements. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) predict efficiency gains from privatization only if control rights pass from the government to private investors. Similarly, Claessens (1997) contends that, if the state maintains majority ownership, the firm is more likely to delay restructuring and maintain excessive employment. In empirical studies of the effects of privatization, D'Souza and Megginson (1998), Boubakri and Cosset (1998 ), Eckel, Eckel, and Singal (1997 ), and Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994 report larger efficiency improvements following sales in which the government relinquished majority control. Accordingly, we expect that the greatest performance improvements will result from privatizations in which private owners gain control of the firm.
The presence of foreign investors may also affect the degree of post-privatization performance improvement. Foreign investment has accounted for an increasing share of privatization's sales in LDCs. Sader (1993) In their study of Czech privatizations, Anderson, Makhija, and Spiro (1997) identify 41 firms with direct foreign investment and 947 firms with no foreign investment. They find that profitability as measured either by return on equity or revenue per employee is significantly higher for the firms with foreign investors. Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997) in their study of 3,792 privatized firms from Slovenia document a significantly positive relationship between profitability and foreign ownership and a significantly negative relationship between leverage and foreign ownership.
The amount of employee share ownership may also contribute to changes in post-privatization performance. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) predict theoretically that employees are unlikely to support value-maximizing restructuring efforts, and Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) conclude that equity ownership by employees does not spur performance improvements after privatization. However, Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997) find a significantly positive relation between revenues and employee share ownership and a significantly negative relationship between leverage and employee share ownership. Accordingly, we seek to help resolve this ambiguity by testing for a relation between employee ownership and firm performance following privatization. We are agnostic about the expected direction of impact.
C. Restructuring, Changes in CEO, and Changes in Board of Directors
Changes in the privatized firm's upper management may also trigger efficiency gains. Replacing the often politically-appointed manager of the SOE with a professional businessperson should lead to performance improvements. For example, Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) recognizes that the existing SOE management may lack the appropriate human capital to effectively guide the privatized firm in the new, competitive market. He also finds a positive relation between a change in the CEO and the market value of the privatized firm. Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) cite new human capital as an important factor in increasing the probability of value-maximizing restructuring. Megginson, Nash, and
Van Randenborgh (1994) also examine how executive change affects the operating performance of the newly-privatized firm and report stronger efficiency gains for firms with larger changes in top management. Based on the findings of these studies, we expect that restructuring a firm in the form of management changes will positively impact the degree of post-privatization performance improvement.
D. Exposure to Competition
In addition to changing ownership, privatization may also expose the firm to the discipline of product market competition. Having to compete with other firms for customers and market share may provide the pressure required to stimulate greater efficiency and profitability. Ramamurti (1997) , Newbery and Pollitt (1997) , and Vickers and Yarrow (1991) identify competition as a major determinant of post-privatization performance improvements. Vickers and Yarrow (1991) suggest that while privatization should stimulate efficiency gains in competitive environments, there is no advantage to private ownership when market power exists. Additionally, Boardman and Laurin (1996) contend that firms such as utilities, which are not subject to the discipline of competitive pressure, would be less likely to benefit from privatization. Several empirical studies--including Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994) , and LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999)--report significant differences when comparing the post-privatization performance of competitive and non-competitive firms. These studies find that both types of firms (competitive and regulated) experience efficiency improvements. However, the efficiency gains are significantly greater for firms in competitive markets. We extend this analysis by testing for post-privatization performance differences between competitive firms and regulated utilities.
III. Data and Methodology
The identification of the sources of post-privatization performance improvements has been elusive primarily because of the lack of a large, multi-national, multi-industry database. We feel our study overcomes this problem by utilizing a sample of 118 companies from 29 countries and 28 industries. We draw our sample of privatized firms from the appendix of Megginson and Netter (2001) .
Through mail requests, we directly solicit annual reports and prospectuses from the privatized firms. Our data are collected by hand from these annual reports and prospectuses we receive from the privatized companies. 3 In order to generate comparable post-issue financial and accounting data, we limit our analysis to share-issue privatizations. While governments may use other methods of privatization (e.g., direct sale to another company), share-issue privatizations (SIPs) represent the largest and most economically and politically important privatizations. Therefore, we feel that our database allows us to undertake the single most thorough multi-national, multi-industry examination of the financial and operating impact of privatization.
We compute proxies from the materials received directly from the privatized firms (prospectuses and annual reports) as well as from supplemental sources such as Disclosure databases, Infotrac, Privatization International, The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times. We use local currency data in our performance measurements. Whenever possible, the ratios include nominal data in both the numerator and denominator. We also emphasize ratios computed using current-year, "flow" measures, which are less sensitive to inflation and to accounting conventions.
Our initial tests follow the techniques of Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994) . To determine post-privatization performance changes, we utilize a matched pair methodology (i.e., compare pre-and post-privatization results). We begin by calculating performance measurement proxies for every company over a seven-year period (covering the three years before to the three years after privatization).
We next calculate the mean value of each variable for each firm over the 3-year "before" and "after"
periods. Since the year of privatization (year 0) includes phases of both state and private ownership, we exclude year 0 from our mean calculations, though we examine several variables that are normalized relative to that firm's value in year 0 (variable value in year 0 equals 1.00). To test for differences in the pre-and post-privatization performance improvements, we use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. This procedure will identify any significant differences in the mean values of the "before" and "after" samples.
We additionally utilize a proportion test to determine whether the percentage (p) of firms experiencing changes in a specified direction is greater than 50 percent.
After identifying the prevalence of post-privatization performance improvements, we begin our search for the factors that may explain why newly-privatized firms experience these changes in profitability and efficiency. Initially, we partition the total data into various sub-samples. We use the Kruskal-Wallis procedure to test for significant differences between the subgroups. A significant difference between subsamples would indicate that the subgroup classification factor might be an important determinant of post-privatization performance changes.
In the second stage of empirical testing, we perform a multivariate OLS regression to examine how various firm, industry, and country factors affect the post-privatization performance. In each of our models, the dependent variable is the change in the value of the performance proxy (mean value after privatization / mean value before privatization). The independent variables are factors that the theoretical and empirical literature identify as potential determinants of post-privatization efficiency gains.
Our database includes privatizations of 118 firms (from 29 countries and 28 industries). These transactions take place from 1961-1995. Therefore, our data span a larger time period than any other privatization study. Table 1 Table 1 about here ****
We next specify empirical proxies (also summarized in Table 10 ) for each factor predicted to affect post-privatization performance. The following section defines these proxies and describes how we expect each variable to impact the newly-privatized firm's financial and operating performance.
IV. Empirical Proxies and Testable Predictions

A. Capital Market Monitoring, Development of the Economy, and Economic Growth Rates
The level of sophistication and intensity of capital market monitoring should influence the degree of the newly-privatized firm's performance improvements. We expect that firms with shares trading in larger, more-developed markets should experience greater efficiency gains. We use GNP per capita in U.S.$ to measure the development of the economy. To determine the effect of growth in the economy during the pre and post privatization window, we use the real GDP growth in the economy. We also perform the Kruskal-Wallis procedure to test for differences between the sample of firms in OECD countries and firms in other countries.
To measure the level of capital market development and sophistication, we use the ratio of offer size (market value of the privatizing share issue) to total market capitalization. Since this value will be smaller for firms in larger financial markets, we predict a negative relation between the issue size/market cap ratio and the post-privatization efficiency gains. For private ownership to trigger performance improvements, the rights of the shareholder must be enforced. We expect that a stronger degree of shareholder rights protection will lead to greater post-privatization performance improvements. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV, 1998) and Bortolotti, Fantini, Siniscalco, and Vitalini (1997) find that countries with an English common law tradition provide a more favorable legal environment for shareholders than nations with other types of legal systems. Therefore, we include an indicator variable to identify firms operating in nations with a common law tradition and test for differences between the samples of firms in common law countries and firms in other legal systems. We also use the LLSV Shareholders Rights Index (SRI) to measure how strongly a nation's laws favor the interests of minority stockholders. The SRI takes on a larger value as the legal support of shareholder rights increases. Higher values of SRI should lead to greater post-privatization performance improvements.
B. Measuring Impact of Changes in Ownership
Following the transfer of ownership from the state to private investors, we expect significant changes in the owner's (and manager's) incentives and in the firm's objectives. These changes should indicate a more focused and efficient organization. Since SOEs typically pursue objectives inconsistent with profit maximization, we expect that privatizations that generate the largest amount of private ownership will experience the greatest performance improvements. In addition, we predict stronger efficiency gains for firms with more foreign ownership. We also expect a positive relation between the percentage of employee ownership and the amount of performance improvement.
We use the percentage of shares retained by the government as a proxy for state ownership, and we use percentage of shares allocated to foreign investors at the time of issue to measure foreign ownership. As a proxy for employee ownership, we use the percentage of shares allocated to employees at the time of issue. We also perform the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine the effect of "control" on performance improvement. We divide the sample into "control" and "no-control" groups. The "control" group consists of firms with greater than fifty percent private ownership, and the "no-control" group consists of firms with less than fifty percent private ownership. We also examine this effect using regression analyses.
C. Restructuring, Changes in CEO and Changes in Board of Directors
Just prior to privatization, we find that many firms restructure. In particular, we find firms restructure through organizational changes and/or acquisitions and divestitures and/or financial restructurings (i.e., debt write-offs). There are 69 firms for which we can definitively determine whether or not restructuring occurred. By examining prospectuses, annual reports, and secondary news reports and company disclosures, we verify that 41 of 69 firms did no pre-privatization restructuring, leaving 28 firms that did restructure during the privatization process. 4 If firms restructure in order to improve profitability and efficiency, we predict that restructuring should increase performance improvements. We perform the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine the effect of restructuring. We also perform similar tests to assess the impact of changes in CEO and changes in Board of Directors on post-privatization improvements.
For the Kruskal-Wallis test, we divide the sample into (i) firms that restructured and firms that did not restructure, (ii) firms that had a new CEO after privatization and firms with existing CEO continuing after privatization, and (iii) firms with less than fifty percent turnover in Board of Directors and firms with greater than fifty percent changes. The regression analyses proxy these with dummy variables.
D. Measuring Exposure to Competition
The pressure of international product market competition may force the newly-privatized firm to operate more efficiently. Vickers and Yarrow (1992) contend that the introduction of competition is the driving force behind post-privatization performance improvements. Therefore, firms privatized in competitive industries may experience the largest efficiency gains. However, many privatized firms remain insulated from competition. For example, regulated utilities frequently retain significant market power and continue to effectively function as monopolies. These firms may be able to exploit this market power to increase profitability following privatization. Menyah and Paudyal (1996) find that privatized utilities generate significantly positive abnormal returns. These findings suggest that regulated utilities may experience the greatest post-privatization performance gains. Accordingly, we test whether performance improvements are stronger in regulated utilities (which retain significant market power) or competitive firms (which must operate efficiently to survive in internationally competitive markets). To distinguish regulated utilities from competitive firms, we include an indicator variable, which has a value of one if the privatized firm is a telecom or an electric/water/gas utility. We also use the Kruskal-Wallis test (and dummy variables in the regression analyses) to compare firms that are in regulated industries and firms operating in competitive industries.
V. Empirical Results
Our first round of empirical tests measures post-privatization financial and operating performance. Our data confirm that, following privatization, firms experience significant increases in profitability, efficiency, and real output in the three-year post-privatization period, compared to the average values from the 3-year pre-privatization period. Table 2 summarizes our specific results. We measure profitability with return on sales (net income/sales). Following privatization, average (median) return on sales increases from 6.1% (5.2%) to 9.3% (7.0%). This increase is significant at the 1% level.
We further note that a statistically significant 70.6% of our sample firms have positive changes in profitability. Therefore, our data strongly confirm that firms become more profitable after privatization. Output (real sales) also significantly increases following privatization. We compare average, inflation-adjusted sales for the pre-privatization period to the average level for the post-privatization period. The increase following privatization is significant at the one percent level. The proportion test also indicates that real output significantly rises in the years following privatization. Over 70% of our newly-privatized sample generate higher levels of real sales in the post-privatization period.
**** Insert
Our data also confirm the findings of Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998) that employment does not significantly decline following privatization. We find no measurable change in employment. In fact, our average firm's employment increases from 32,570 before to 34,160 after privatization. Therefore, the strong post-privatization performance improvements are achieved, on average, without sacrificing employment security.
We also examine changes in the privatized firms' capital spending and leverage. Capital expenditure increases significantly following privatization. We compare average, inflation-adjusted capital expenditure for the pre-privatization period to the average level for the post-privatization period.
The increase following privatization is significant at the one percent level. The proportion test also indicates that capital spending significantly rises in the years following privatization. Over 65% of our sample generated higher levels of real capital expenditure in the post-privatization period. Finally, our results show that leverage decreases significantly-due to a combination of greater retained profitability and a few primary share offerings. The decrease following privatization is significant at the one percent
level. The proportion test shows that over 72% of our firms reduce leverage after privatization.
Having confirmed that newly-privatized firms experience significant increases in profitability and efficiency, we next turn to our search for the causes of these performance improvements. We begin by partitioning our total data into subsamples based on factors that the literature identifies as potentially important influences on the firm's post-privatization financial and operating efficiency.
A. Kruskal-Wallis Test Results
In Table 3 , we compare the performance of firms from countries with a common law tradition to the performance of firms from countries with other legal systems. Consistent with the predictions, our data indicate significantly stronger post-privatization profitability increases for firms in common law countries. Specifically, firms from common law countries report significantly higher profitability (return on sales). The average (median) increase in the return on sales for a common law firm was 4.7% (2.8%)
as compared to 2.2% (1.3%) for firms in other countries. The difference in the performance of the subgroups is significant at the ten percent level. The data also indicate that sales efficiency (output per employee) improves by a greater amount for firms in the common law countries although the difference is not statistically significant. The mean (median) increase in sales efficiency for common law firms is 9.5% (11.6%). The firms from other legal systems experience increases of only 6.5% (5.1%). Therefore, a country's legal system appears to effect post-privatization performance.
**** Insert Table 3 about here **** Table 4 Table 4 about here **** Whether or not control passes to private investors may also impact the performance of the newlyprivatized firm. Accordingly, we partition our data into two groups: a control sample (where private investors own at least 50% of the equity) and a non-control sample (where the government retains over 50% ownership). Table 5 summarizes the results of our comparison of these subsamples. We note a marginally significant increase in the amount of profitability improvement between the two groups.
Specifically, the profitability of the control sample increased by a mean (median) of 3.6% (2.0%). The profits of the non-control groups also increased but the gains were less dramatic. For the firms where the government remained as majority owner, the mean (median) change in return on sales was 2.8% (1.8%).
We find no significant difference in the sales efficiency or the real sales levels for the two subgroups.
Finally, our data show a (marginally) significantly greater decline in leverage for the non-control subsample. The average (median) decrease in leverage for firms in the non-control group is 7% (14.2%) while the average (median) decrease in leverage for firms in the control group is 5.8% (3.8%). Again, the Kruskal-Wallis test shows no significant differences between the two subgroups.
**** Insert Table 5 about here ****
The level of development of a country's economy may also be a potential determinant of the firm's performance following privatization. In Table 6 about here **** Table 7 presents comparisons of firms that restructured versus firms that did not restructure and provides significant evidence that restructuring "adds value" for the newly-privatized firm. First, restructuring triggers higher levels of output growth and greater profitability improvements. For the restructured firms, the average increase in real sales is nearly double that of the sample of firms that do not restructure. Additionally, the restructuring apparently enhances profitability since the average increase in ROS for the restructured firms is 5.1% (versus 1.8% for those that choose not to restructure).
Our data also indicate that restructured firms experience significantly larger increases in sales efficiency and larger decreases in leverage than firms that do not restructure. The mean (median) sales efficiency increase for restructured firms is 14.76% (19.81%) as opposed to 3.08% (0.76%) for firms that did not restructure. This difference is significant at the five percent level. The mean (median) decrease in leverage for restructured firms is 10.06% (9.2%) compared to only 3.01% (5.59%) for non-restructured firms. The Kruskal-Wallis test for leverage is significant at the ten percent level. Finally, our results also indicate significant differences in employment for firms that restructure versus firms that did not restructure. Firms that do not restructure maintain significantly higher levels of employment following privatization. Taken together, these results imply that restructuring generally leads to greater postprivatization performance improvements.
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** Changes in a newly-privatized firm's upper management may also trigger performance improvements. Table 9 about here ****
B. Regression Results
In our multivariate regression models, the dependent variables represent percentage changes after privatization in return on sales (ROS), level of real sales (RSALE), sales efficiency (SEFF), employment (EMP), real capital expenditure (CAPEX), and leverage (LEV), respectively. To explain these changes in post-privatization performance, we employ the independent variables (state ownership, foreign ownership, employee ownership, restructured firms, regulated firms, the shareholder's rights index (SRI), GNP per capita ($), offer amount to market capitalization, and real GDP growth) listed in Table 10 . Table 11 presents the results of our regressions. Tables 10 and 11 about here ****
**** Insert
B.1. Profitability
Ownership is the most significant determinant of changes in post-privatization profitability. First, we identify a significantly negative relation between profitability and employee ownership. This suggests that a one percent increase in employee ownership leads to a 9% decrease in profitability improvements.
Our finding that higher employee ownership leads to lower profitability improvements is consistent with Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) who conclude that providing equity incentives to existing employees does not add value. Additionally, the regression analysis reveals a significantly positive relationship between profitability and state ownership. A one percent increase in state ownership leads to a 1.59 percentage point profitability increase. This is puzzling since we expect performance improvements to increase as state ownership decreases. It could be that a large residual stake gives the government greater incentive to encourage performance improvements, since it has more of the company left to sell in subsequent rounds. Finally, the regression analysis indicates that restructuring has the expected positive impact on profitability (although the effect is not statistically significant). Overall, it appears that corporate governance is the major driver of the change in the profitability that generally follows privatization.
B.2. Real Sales
Consistent with the predictions of Vickers and Yarrow (1991) , the regression analysis shows a significant positive relation between output and competition. This also confirms the conclusions of Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994) , who find that firms thrust into a competitive environment quickly become more productive. According to 
B.3. Efficiency
The efficiency regression provides the strongest evidence of the value added by restructuring.
Firms that restructure have significantly larger improvements in operating efficiency. Specifically, restructured firms show a 18 percentage-point greater increase in sales efficiency than firms that do not restructure. Since restructuring has an insignificant impact on employment (see section B.4), the efficiency improvements that result from restructuring are not simply due to job cuts. The restructuring apparently leads to a more efficient deployment of resources.
The level of financial market development also impacts post-privatization efficiency improvements. The significant, negative sign of the offer amount to market capitalization ratio indicates that firms in larger, more developed capital markets experience larger gains in efficiency following privatization. This is consistent with our expectations since firms in larger markets should be subject to greater scrutiny and capital market pressure. The more stringent monitoring apparently spurs the newlyprivatized firm to function with greater efficiency.
Consistent with the results of other studies-particularly those examining the transition economies-we find that foreign ownership contributes to stronger efficiency improvements after privatization. The significant, positive sign of the foreign ownership variable indicates that a one percentage point increase in foreign ownership leads to a 0.67 percent increase in post-privatization sales efficiency. We expect this outcome since foreign ownership should result in an infusion of managerial talent, access to advanced technology, and entry into more lucrative product and capital markets. Finally, the amount of national wealth (GNP per capita) has a marginally significant, negative relation with postprivatization efficiency improvements. These results are consistent with Boubakri and Cosset (1998) who also document strong efficiency improvements for firms in developing nations.
The independent variables explain 26 percent of the variation in the sales efficiency after privatization. Overall, our data indicate that foreign ownership, restructuring, economic development, and capital market sophistication are key determinants of post-privatization efficiency improvements.
B.4. Employment
Ownership and capital market pressure appear to be the major sources of the changes in employment after privatization. As predicted, there is a significant, negative relation between foreign ownership and post-privatization employment levels. Foreign owners, who are less affected by political and social concerns, are more likely to reduce jobs if the divested firms are truly overstaffed. The regression indicates that a one percentage point increase in foreign ownership leads to a 1.74 percent decrease in employment. Additionally, our analysis yields the somewhat surprising result that higher state ownership leads to lower post-privatization employment. This is unexpected since overemployment was common in state-owned firms. As with foreign owners, we expected larger amounts of private ownership would stimulate deeper cuts in job rolls. However, our results suggest that the state is also not hesitant to eliminate jobs, especially if such reductions are offset by increased profitability (as indicated by our ROS regression). This finding is also consistent with the proposition that partial privatizations
give the state greater incentives to maximize value in order to maximize the future sale price of the government's remaining stake.
Capital market characteristics also affect the level of changes in post-privatization employment.
Specifically, our analysis shows that stronger protection of shareholder rights leads to deeper cuts in employment. This is consistent with Wurgler's (2000) contention that stringent legal enforcement of investor rights empowers shareholders to object to overinvestment and limit inefficiencies (such as overstaffing). Furthermore, the development and sophistication of the nation's capital market impacts postprivatization employment. The data indicate a significant positive relation between employment changes and the ratio of offer size to market capitalization, suggesting that firms which are relatively large are more likely to reduce post-privatization employment. This suggests that the closer monitoring of the analysts and sophisticated investors in these larger markets may drive the newly-privatized firms to seek efficiency improvements by lowering excessive employment.
The regression shows that the explanatory variables explain 24 percent of the variation in the changes in employment. Ownership (by the state and foreign investors), protection of shareholder rights, and capital market development are the key determinants of employment changes after privatization.
B.5. Capital Expenditures
The only variable that has a significant (positive) sign is employee ownership. This means that a one percentage point increase in employee ownership leads, rather surprisingly, to a 7.49 percent increase in real capital expenditure post-privatization. All other variables have insignificant coefficients.
B.6. Leverage
Our model also reveals that the development level of the economy, and the growth in the economy are important determinants of changes in leverage following privatization. A $1000 increase in GNP per capita leads to a 0.13 percentage point increase in leverage and GDP growth is significantly positively related to relative. Finally, the independent variables explain 37 percent of the variation in the leverage following privatization.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Over the last twenty years, privatization has transformed the world's economic landscape through a sweeping reduction of the role of the state in many nations' economies. An economic event this profound raises many important questions ---most of which are, as yet, not completely answered. The first major issue is whether governments should be privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Several recent empirical studies (summarized in Megginson and Netter (2000)) document significant improvements in the financial and operating performance of newly-privatized firms. We add to this evidence regarding the impact of privatization. Specifically, we use a sample of 118 firms (from 29 countries and 28 industries) to examine the firm-level effects of privatization. Following privatization, firms significantly increase profitability, output per employee, and real sales. These results add to the growing empirical evidence that, after privatization, firms become more profitable and efficient. The newly-privatized firms also achieve these performance improvements without reducing average total employment. We feel that our findings are especially valuable because our analysis covers more firms, countries, industries, and/or years than any other empirical study of privatization.
Given this strong empirical evidence of the financial and operational benefits of privatization, the pressing issue is no longer whether privatization leads to performance improvements, but rather why do these post-privatization performance improvements occur. This study seeks to provide some answers regarding the sources of the financial and operating improvements of newly-privatized firms. First, we expect that firms subject to greater capital market discipline should exhibit stronger post-privatization performance. Our results confirm a positive relation between the level of capital market development and the amount of post-privatization efficiency improvements.
Second, the changes in ownership brought on by privatization should also contribute to the pervasive performance improvements. As expected, higher amounts of foreign ownership lead to larger gains in post-privatization efficiency. Additionally, we expect that firms will become more productive as state ownership decreases. Our results confirm that real output significantly increases as state ownership declines. Finally, we test for the impact of employee ownership on the performance of the newly-privatized firm. Consistent with earlier empirical studies, profitability decreases as employee ownership increases. Therefore, the proportional post-privatization ownership (by the state, by foreign investors, and by employees) is an important indicator of the firm's success following privatization.
Additionally, since governments frequently choose to restructure a firm prior to privatization through acquisitions, divestitures, and/or financial restructuring (i.e., debt write-offs), we examine whether such restructurings contribute to increased improvements in post-privatization operating performance. Our results confirm that restructurings are important determinants of post-privatization performance. Specifically, our data provide evidence that restructuring leads to stronger efficiency improvements. This table presents empirical results for our full sample of privatized firms. The table presents, for each empirical proxy, the number of useable observations, the mean and median values of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to privatization, the mean and median change in the proxy's value after versus before privatization, and a test of significance of the median change. We employ the Wilcoxon rank sum test (with its z-statistic) as our test for significance for the change in mean values. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this change. Finally, sales efficiency uses inflation-adjusted sales figures divided by the number of employees each year. Deflated sales per employee is normalized to equal 1.000 in year 0 so other year figures are expressed as a fraction of per capita output in the year of divestment. Real sales and real capital expenditure are computed similarly. 
Variables
Comparison of Performance Changes Following Privatization for Companies From Countries with a Common Law Legal System Versus Companies from Countries with Another Type of Legal System
This table presents comparisons of performance changes for companies headquartered in countries with an English Common Law tradition versus companies headquartered in countries with other legal systems. The countries, in our sample, that follow English Common Law tradition are Australia, Canada, Ireland, Jamaica, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand and U.K. The table presents, for each empirical proxy the number of useable observations, the mean and median values of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to privatization, the mean and median change in the proxy's value after versus before privatization, and a test of significance of the mean change. We employ the Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its z-statistic) as our test for significance for the change in mean values. The final three columns present the Kruskal-Wallis results for differences between firms in common law countries and those that are not. The Krusual-Wallis test statistic mentions the 'p' value using the chi-square approximation. Finally, sales efficiency uses inflation-adjusted sales figures divided by the number of employees each year. Deflated sales per employee is normalized to equal to 1.0 in year 0 so other year figures are expressed as a fraction of per capita output in the year of divestment. 
Development of Economy
Gross National Product per capita in U.S.$ thousands.
Offer to Market Capitalization Capital Market Development
Ratio of offer amount (market value of the privatizing share issue) to total market capitalization
Real GDP Growth Growth in the Economy
Percentage growth in Real GDP for three year postprivatization period over the three year pre-privatization period Regression results to identify the sources of performance improvements in newly-privatized firms. The dependent variables in the six models are change in return on sales (ROS), change in real sales, change in sales efficiency (sales per employee), change in employment, change in real capital expenditure, and change in leverage respectively. Change in each of the dependent variable is defined as percentage growth rate of the average of the three years post-privatization data over the average of three years preprivatization data. See Table 10 
